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The propagation of new rights for other parties in the reproductive 
process, namely the fetus and men, is curtailing women’s reproductive 
autonomy.  The ground-breaking decision of Roe v. Wade1 
established an allocation of rights between a woman and the state, 
and has since served as the cornerstone of women’s reproductive 
                                                          
∗ J.D., American University, Washington College of Law, 2004; B.A., Emory 
University, 2001.  I would like to extend my thanks to Professor Mary Clark for  
her support and encouragement, and to Nancy Marcus for introducing me to the  
issues and inspiring me to enter the debate. 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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rights.  Recently, however, new laws and medical technologies have 
implicated burgeoning conflicts beyond merely the interests of the 
state.2  Fetal personhood laws have begun to reallocate rights between 
a woman and the fetus and to recognize a man’s interests in the 
potential life.3  In addition, artificial reproductive technology has 
created a choice for the man to procreate or to avoid procreation 
following the act of reproduction.4 
Left unchecked, these developments eventually will erode women’s 
reproductive rights.5  The question arises whether this attrition in 
women’s rights is a positive trend.  Some analysts argue that new 
legislation like fetal personhood laws and advances in reproductive 
technologies balance the rights of all parties involved in the 
reproductive process, where traditionally women’s rights 
automatically override those of the man and the fetus.6  Other gender 
experts question whether these changes in the law are just another 
instance of a male-dominated culture seeking to return to a time 
when the law privileged men and viewed women as largely lacking 
personal rights.7  Whether these changes are viewed as positive or 
negative, legislators and judges are encroaching upon women’s 
rights.8  This article asserts that feminist theorists must concentrate on 
shaping these new areas to ensure that law-makers do not deprive 
women further of their contested reproductive liberties. 
                                                          
 2. See, e.g., Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (2004) 
(recognizing the fetus at any stage of development as a potential independent victim 
of certain federal crimes). 
 3. See, e.g., Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995) (permitting bereaved 
father to bring a cause of action under West Virginia’s wrongful death statute for the 
death of his wife and her nonviable fetus); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal 
Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal 
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 604-05 (citing several instances in which courts have 
punished women for their acts during pregnancy adversely affecting the fetus). 
 4. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding in a dispute 
regarding the disposition of embryos that the party objecting to procreation generally 
has the greater interest and should prevail).  In Davis, the court found in favor of the 
father because his preference was for destruction of the embryos while the mother 
sought to donate them to a childless couple.  Id. at 592. 
 5. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 611-12 (noting that the anti-abortion movement 
deliberately urges enhanced legal status for the fetus outside of the abortion context 
in order to foster an atmosphere hostile to abortion rights). 
 6. See Mary A. Totz, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: 
Toward Recognition of Men’s Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 182-83. 
 7. Johnsen, supra note 3, at 624-25. 
 8. See infra Part II (writing that, in implicating rights for other parties in the 
reproductive equation beyond the woman, the courts and legislatures make critical 
mistakes; one example is ignoring the crucial difference between fetuses and living 
persons). 
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I.  FEMINIST THEORIES 
Feminist theorists present several diverse perspectives on how best 
to increase and protect women’s rights.  Formal equality theorists 
posit that society should treat individuals according to their actual 
characteristics, regardless of gender, rather than accentuating 
individual differences and reinforcing societal assumptions based on 
stereotypes.9  Thus, this theory professes that equalization with men 
best serves women’s rights.  Liberal feminists expand upon formal 
equality by adding traditional liberal ideas that promote individual 
autonomy and privacy.10  Liberal feminists struggle over whether men 
and women should be treated the same in an effort to establish 
equality or treated differently in a way that results in equality.  
Although modern legal authorities are skeptical of the argument that 
separate standards actually can result in equality, they nonetheless 
have embraced the importance of personal autonomy and privacy in 
the reproductive rights arena by upholding a woman’s right to end 
her pregnancy. 
Relational feminism grew out of a negative reaction to this focus on 
individual rights.11  This theory advocates the ethic of care in order to 
create a system of interconnected people and to develop a sense of 
mutual responsibility.12  It began with the research of Professor Carol 
Gilligan, who investigated the differences between boys and girls in 
their moral development and found two distinct moral analytic 
processes.13  Robin West carried forth this idea and differentiated 
between men and women, in part, by noting a woman’s capacity to be 
materially connected to another human life, namely a fetus.14  These 
connections give women different rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis 
all of the other entities involved in the reproductive process, 
including men, the fetus, and the state.15  Thus, relational feminists 
                                                          
 9. See Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: The “Ethic of 
Care,” Fetal Personhood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291, 300 (1996) (noting 
that the Equal Rights Amendment and women’s civil rights laws are premised on this 
theory). 
 10. See id. at 301 (explaining that U. S. Supreme Court reproductive 
jurisprudence is based on an individual’s right to autonomy and privacy). 
 11. See id. (noting that the relational feminists believed that the focus on 
individual rights would interfere with the development of interdependency). 
 12. Id. at 301-02. 
 13. See id. at 302 (reporting that Gilligan found that boys employ an individual 
rights approach in their analytic process towards justice, while girls framed their 
moral beliefs based on relational care). 
 14. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) 
(maintaining that at least four material experiences all relating to pregnancy connect 
women to other human beings). 
 15. Id. 
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believe that women and men approach the world differently, which 
may result in a greater allocation of reproductive rights to the woman 
based on her unique experiences.16 
Finally, dominance theory posits that men and women are different 
because of the historic societal fact that men hold a dominant 
position, while women occupy a subordinate one.17  Because of the 
often private nature of this dominance, proponents of this theory 
have argued for greater legal regulation of areas where the law 
traditionally has been absent.18  For example, leading advocate 
Catherine MacKinnon has successfully persuaded law-makers to 
acknowledge sexual harassment as an abuse of power in the 
workplace and to enact sex-discrimination employment laws to punish 
such behavior.19 
Each theory approaches reproductive rights law from a different 
perspective.  As a result, feminist theorists must be watchful and 
creative in developing strategies as legislatures and courts become 
increasingly bold in their attempts to deprive women of their 
fundamental rights and liberties.20 
II.  THE PROLIFERATION OF FETAL PERSONHOOD LAWS 
Fetal personhood refers to certain areas of the law that consider the 
fetus a separate unborn person, rather than a part of the woman 
carrying the fetus.21  Historically, the fetus only acquired legal rights 
                                                          
 16. See McConnell, supra note 9, at 302-03; Karen H. Rothenberg, New 
Perspectives for Teaching and Scholarship: The Role of Gender in Law and Health 
Care, 54 MD. L. REV. 473, 481 (1995). 
 17. See Rothenberg, supra note 16, at 482 (noting that dominance theorists 
believe that men maintain the dominant position primarily through the threat of 
sexual violence). 
 18. See id. (explaining that dominance theorists also advocate aggressive legal 
intervention to combat family violence perpetuated by men in the private sphere). 
 19. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986) (Catherine A. 
MacKinnon on brief for respondent); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION at 1, 9-10 (1979); EEOC 
Guidelines, 29 CFR §1604.11 (1985); see also Rothenberg, supra note 16, at 482 
(highlighting this theory’s particular focus on sex and violence against women and 
the notion that the law should protect women against private actors, namely men, 
who engage in such conduct). 
 20. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 603-04 (stating that legal recognition of the 
rights of the fetus could be used against women); McConnell, supra note 9, at 291-92 
(recognizing that West Virginia went against U.S. Supreme Court precedent when 
declaring fetal personhood in wrongful death actions). 
 21. See McConnell, supra note 9; see also Aaron Wagner, Texas Two-Step: 
Serving Up Fetal Rights By Side-Stepping Roe v. Wade Has Set the Table for Another 
Showdown on Fetal Personhood in Texas and Beyond, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1085 
(2001) (discussing the return of the “fetal person” that disappeared after Roe in the 
vocabulary of the U.S. Congress and state lawmakers). 
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separate from those of the woman at birth.22  Statutes and common 
law precedent recognizing the fetus as a person while still in utero 
have eroded this live birth requirement.23  More specifically, state and 
federal legislatures have enacted civil wrongful death statutes and 
courts have permitted lawsuits against a woman by her child or the 
state for actions taken during pregnancy.24  It is an area that is 
growing substantially.  In 2003, multiple state legislatures considered 
measures concerning criminal punishments for harm to a fetus or 
embryo independent of the harm to the pregnant woman.25  These 
provisions only conflict with the holding of Roe to the extent that they 
give the fetus rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.26  Because 
the Supreme Court failed to delineate what other fetal personhood 
rights a state may give a fetus outside of the abortion context, state 
legislators have skirted Roe by not awarding protections precluded by 
that holding.27 
Roe’s failure to define clearly what rights to personhood a fetus may 
hold has allowed states to undermine the Supreme Court’s holding.28  
The logical conclusion to this gradual erosion is that states, which 
continually declare a fetus a person, will reach a point when fetal 
personhood is a foregone conclusion, even in the abortion context.29  
                                                          
 22. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 161 (observing that U.S. law has not accorded legal rights 
to the unborn except in the case of inheritance and tort law, and then only when the 
pregnancy resulted in a live birth). 
 23. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 1100-01 (discussing the abandonment of the 
born alive rule in favor of the viability requirement for wrongful death actions). 
 24. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) 
(allowing child to sue mother for taking tetracycline during pregnancy, which may 
have caused the child to have discolored teeth); Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 
Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980) (suggesting that a child could sue his parents for 
proceeding with the pregnancy if the parents had prior knowledge of birth defects 
that would cause pain and suffering to the child). 
 25. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REPORT ON THE 
STATUS OF WOMEN’S REPROD. RIGHTS, NATIONWIDE TRENDS: 2003 ANTI-CHOICE AND PRO-
CHOICE STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 5 (13th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WHO DECIDES?] 
(noting that during 2003 twenty-one states considered forty-four separate bills that 
would criminalize harm to a fetus independent of the pregnant woman), available at 
http://www.naral.org/yourstate/whodecides/trends/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/
security/getfile.cfm&PageID=10163 (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). 
 26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (declaring “that the word ‘person,’ as used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn”). 
 27. See WHO DECIDES?, supra note 25, at 5 (warning that anti-choice legislators 
enact these laws under the pretext of  concern for pregnant women but the legislators 
sympathetic to the anti-abortion movement really are trying to undermine a woman’s 
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy). 
 28. Wagner, supra note 21, at 1102-03 (noting that while states generally accept 
the limits on fetal rights imposed by Roe, they have increasingly elevated the rights of 
the fetus under criminal laws in a direct assault on Roe). 
 29. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 1089-90 (arguing that the state of inconsistence 
in fetal personhood laws will eventually undercut Roe completely). 
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Currently, the most extreme examples of this erosion appear in 
Louisiana and Missouri, where state statutes declare that a fetus is a 
person from the time of conception or fertilization and 
implantation.30  Few states have gone as far, but almost all have begun 
to incorporate the idea of a fetus as a person in areas of the law 
outside of the constitutional context.31  Feminist theorists must take 
notice of this trend, as there is no way to equalize the rights of the 
fetus and the woman without undermining the liberty interests Roe 
granted women.  The movement to recognize a fetus as a person 
inherently conflicts with a woman’s right to bodily integrity and 
procreational liberty. 
A.  Wrongful Death 
All states have enacted wrongful death statutes to protect the 
relational interests of families and to provide compensation for loss 
following a homicide.32  Most civil wrongful death statutes name 
spouses and children as the beneficiaries and provide damages based 
on pecuniary loss rather than a subjective analysis of grief.33  In 1946, 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
permitted a wrongful death action claim, where a fetus was born alive, 
but subsequently died from injuries received in utero.34  Every state 
adopted this “born-alive” rule by 1967.35 
In 1971, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the 
constitutionality of that state’s wrongful death statute, which included 
a viable unborn fetus in its definition of a person.36  By 1995, at least 
thirty-six states and the District of Columbia recognized a wrongful 
death cause of action for the death of a viable fetus.37  This trend 
                                                          
 30. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205(1) (West 2004) (stating that “the life of each 
human being begins at conception”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 2004) 
(defining the term “person” as a human being “from the moment of fertilization and 
implantation” for the purposes of Louisiana criminal law). 
 31. See infra II.A-II.C (noting that the trend of viewing a fetus as a person is 
manifested primarily in civil wrongful death statutes, homicide statutes, and 
children’s health insurance coverage provisions). 
 32. See McConnell, supra note 9, at 295 (noting that wrongful death statutes 
deviated from the common law, which did not allow for recovery if the tortfeasor’s 
conduct resulted in death). 
 33. See id. (pointing out that the law nevertheless places a value on the subjective 
criteria of the loss of comfort from the deceased). 
 34. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1946) (noting that 
medical malpractice may have caused the child’s injury and denying the physician-
defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 35. McConnell, supra note 9, at 297. 
 36. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971). 
 37. See Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 480-81 n.4 (Tex. 1995) (listing 
the thirty-seven entities that recognize such a claim). 
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stemmed partially from a negative reaction by legislatures to the idea 
that a fetus that dies right after it is born is somehow different from 
one that dies immediately before being born.38  Viability is a medical 
term of art that typically occurs around twenty-two to twenty-six weeks 
of pregnancy and predates the moment of birth.39  For example, 
Texas defines viability as “the stage of fetal development when, in the 
medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular 
facts of the case, an unborn child possesses the capacity to live outside 
its mother’s womb after its premature birth from any cause.”40  What 
constitutes the period of viability is a subjective standard that certainly 
will continue to change as medical technology improves.41 
In addition, courts in Missouri and West Virginia have allowed 
wrongful death causes of action for the death of a fetus at any stage of 
development.  In Connor v. Monkem,42 the Missouri Supreme Court 
allowed a cause of action for the death of a four-month-old fetus 
under the state’s statutory assignment of rights to the unborn at all 
stages of development.43  West Virginia is the only state that has 
assigned these rights without express statutory authority.  The West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized a wrongful death 
cause of action for a fetus killed at eighteen to twenty-two weeks, 
reasoning that viability is not a proper line of distinction, and the 
goals and purposes of wrongful death statutes are satisfied only by 
interpreting the word “person” to include a nonviable fetus.44  In the 
alternative, several states and the District of Columbia have begun to 
reach outside of the wrongful death statutes and have allowed a 
mental anguish common-law cause of action to parents following the 
death of a fetus.45 
                                                          
 38. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (Ariz. 1985) 
(explaining that viability is a more logical and less arbitrary line than birth because 
the timing of birth is often decided by doctors who induce labor, rather than by 
nature). 
 39. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 457-58 
(1983) (noting that the concept of viability increasingly is blurred through advances 
in reproductive technologies). 
 40. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170.001(3) (Vernon 2004). 
 41. See Christina L. Misner, What If Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion Instead? The 
Effect of Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 265, 290-91 (1995) 
(discussing the viability framework as a problem for the abortion debate as medical 
technology improves). 
 42. 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995). 
 43. See id. at 89 (finding it “relatively clear” that the Missouri legislature 
recognizes a legally protectable interest in a child from the point of conception). 
 44. See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534 (explaining that the distinction between viability 
and non-viability would produce anomalous results because it focused more on the 
status of life than on the wrongful conduct of the tortfeasor). 
 45. Wagner, supra note 21, at 1108. 
7
Brown: Symposium: Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women's Reproductiv
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
94 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:1 
Those statutes and court decisions that recognize fetal personhood 
give rise to serious equal protection concerns.  If the fetus is 
recognized as a person under the law, then the next logical step is to 
assume that this person has rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—rights that were denied expressly in Roe.  Although 
fetal personhood laws have skirted this pronouncement by limiting 
the circumstances where a fetus is designated a separate person, laws 
such as wrongful death statutes erode the marker of viability and 
create a slippery slope to full fetal personhood recognition. 
B.  Criminal Statutes 
Recent developments in criminal law further compound this 
constitutional conflict.  Congress has recognized the fetus as an 
independent victim of a federal crime through the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act, which renders a fetus an “unborn person” at all stages of 
development.46  The federal law includes punishment for causing 
death or injury to the fetus.47  Twenty-eight states already have some 
type of criminal punishment for injury to an “unborn child” under 
their statutory definition of that term.48 
The recent Peterson case in California has galvanized this area of 
the law, both at the federal and state levels.  Congress renamed the 
federal act, “Laci and Connor’s Law” after the woman and her fetus in 
the Peterson matter, although this law would not even have applied in 
her situation.49  Meanwhile, the state of California sentenced Scott 
Peterson to the death penalty based on the charge of murder of both 
Laci and their unborn child.50  Although harm to a pregnant woman 
should be punished severely, these laws represent a broad expansion 
of rights outside of the right of a woman to be free from bodily harm. 
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is another example of 
the change in perspective regarding the fetus that demonstrates the 
inherent tension between the integrity of the woman’s body and the 
recognition and protection of the life of the fetus as a separate 
                                                          
 46. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841. 
 47. § 1841(a). 
 48. HEATHER BOONSTRA, THE GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, THE ANTIABORTION 
CAMPAIGN TO PERSONIFY THE FETUS:  LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE 6 (1999). 
 49. Jeffrey Rosen, A Viable Solution:  Why It Makes Sense To Permit Abortions & 
Punish Those Who Kill Fetuses, 2003-OCT LEGAL AFF. 20 (noting that Laci and 
Connor’s murderer could not be prosecuted under the new federal statute because it 
only applied to those who kill or injure a fetus during the commission of another 
federal offense regardless of knowledge of the pregnancy or intent to harm the 
fetus). 
 50. Stacy Finz & Diana Walsh, Peterson Jury: Death; The Decision: Autopsy 
Photos a Reminder of Brutal Murders, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2004, at A1. 
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person.51  The law is written in broad, non-medical language, yet 
purports to explain and criminalize a certain medical procedure.  In 
2000, the Supreme Court struck down a nearly identical ban that a 
state legislature had enacted because it failed to provide an exception 
for decisions made to protect the health of the woman.52  The federal 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act suffers from the same weaknesses the 
Supreme Court already addressed, as it broadly covers a variety of 
permitted medical procedures and does not contain a health 
exception.53  The Act already has been challenged in federal courts, 
and three courts have held it unconstitutional.54 
Not only have the rights of a fetus been expanded to a level equal 
with the rights of a woman in several circumstances, but also a fetus’s 
personhood rights have engulfed those of women in some criminal 
contexts.  One instance of this phenomenon is the prosecution of 
pregnant women for substance abuse.  In May 2001, a South Carolina 
jury after fourteen minutes of deliberation convicted Regina 
McKnight of homicide by child abuse, after she gave birth to a 
stillborn baby and admitted to crack-cocaine use while pregnant.55  
This type of prosecution fails to recognize the underlying tragedy of 
the number of crack-addicted women and punishes these women for 
the resulting harm to the fetus. 
Other states have instituted alternative forms of punishment, such 
as “protective” incarceration of pregnant women for unrelated crimes, 
prosecution after the birth of the child for harmful actions taken 
while pregnant, and removal of the baby from her custody following 
birth.56  These policies implicate broader social concerns, as they 
disproportionately affect minority and poor women.57  By shifting the 
                                                          
 51. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2003) (imposing monetary and criminal penalties on 
physicians who knowingly perform partial birth abortion procedures). 
 52. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a Nebraska 
statute banning partial-birth abortion procedures because the statute failed to include 
an exception for partial-birth abortions that were necessary to preserve the mother’s 
health). 
 53. See Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, First-Ever Federal Abortion 
Ban Challenged in Court Today (Oct. 31, 2003) (noting that the Nebraska ban also 
prohibited the most commonly used procedure for termination of second trimester 
pregnancy), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pr_03_1031jointpba 
.html. 
 54. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (Neb. 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 55. Dana Page, The Homicide by Child Abuse Conviction of Regina McKnight, 46 
HOW. L.J. 363, 363 (2003). 
 56. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
 57. Id. 
9
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focus from treating and rehabilitating drug-addicted women to 
protecting the fetus, the courts and legislatures are privileging the 
rights of the fetus over the rights of the woman. 
Feminist theorists must be especially cognizant of their arguments 
in this area of the law.  A model of values for law and society based on 
love, connection, interdependence and care may undermine 
reproductive rights by increasing the rights of the fetus to health and 
life, thereby challenging a woman’s bodily integrity and personal 
autonomy.58  The feminist ethic of care argument could be used to 
justify severe impositions on pregnant women by the state based on 
fetal personhood language and logic.  This theory further may 
undermine the abortion arena by recognizing the fetus as an 
individual person and requiring all women to carry a fetus to term 
under the ethic of care for the potential life.59 
The perception of a societal increase in the attention of men to 
family and children could result in a proliferation of men suing 
women for actions taken during pregnancy under these new 
statutes.60  Fetal personhood laws have embraced this idea, and in 
South Carolina, the courts have used such statutes effectively against 
women.61  Relational feminism supports a society that cares for its 
unborn children, but this way of framing the reproductive rights 
discussion is dangerous and could be fatal to women’s rights in the 
reproductive sphere. 
C.  State Health Insurance 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”) is 
federal legislation that provides health insurance coverage to 
uninsured children in families with incomes above Medicaid 
eligibility, but at or below 200% of the federal poverty level.62  SCHIP 
is a broad mandate that allows states to control eligibility standards 
                                                          
 58. See West, supra note 14 (analyzing the differences between the “connection 
thesis” that recognizes women’s material relationship with the fetus and the 
traditional “separation thesis” that values the autonomy of each independent person); 
see also McConnell, supra note 9, at 307-08. 
 59. McConnell, supra note 9, at 307. 
 60. See Totz, supra note 6, 202-07 (arguing that a state could allow a cause of 
action, which, in effect, would accuse the mother of acting tortiously against the 
father’s interest in the child). 
 61. See, e.g., Page, supra note 55, at 379-82 (noting the case where a woman was 
charged and convicted of homicide by child abuse for the death of her unborn child 
under a South Carolina statute that did not even criminalize conduct during 
pregnancy). 
 62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa (2004); see also CYNTHIA DAILARD, THE GUTTMACHER 
REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, NEW SCHIP PRENATAL CARE RULE ADVANCES FETAL RIGHTS AT LOW-
INCOME WOMEN’S EXPENSE 3 (2002) (discussing Congress’ enactment of SCHIP). 
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and benefits for children younger than nineteen years of age.63  
Although SCHIP has important social policy implications, it has been 
used to further erode women’s rights.  In October 2002, the Bush 
Administration promulgated a rule expanding the definition of a 
“child” under SCHIP to include a fetus from conception to birth.64  
This rule expands health insurance coverage for the “child” but does 
not expand coverage for the pregnant woman for post-partum care, 
including ordinary post-delivery hospital care or care for post-delivery 
complications.65  The regulation puts women in direct competition 
with the fetus for coverage because it is unclear whether healthcare 
that is not directly related to the fetus, or that may be detrimental to 
the fetus, would be covered.66  This is just one more attempt on the 
part of the federal government to place the rights of the fetus at an 
equal level with the rights of born persons. 
Wrongful death statutes, homicide statutes, and state health 
insurance policies are combining to reinforce a system of sex 
inequality by developing the rights of the fetus as an individual 
person.  These laws do not reflect a state goal of protecting and 
preserving the life of a fetus but rather attempt to define and regulate 
the behavior of a woman who is experiencing a wanted pregnancy.67 
III.  ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
The encroachment by fetal rights on the rights of the woman 
further is exacerbated by the recent developments in artificial 
reproductive technology, which implicate a different set of rights: the 
rights of men.  One in five couples is unable to conceive a child 
naturally.68  As a result, scientific developments such as in vitro 
                                                          
 63. DAILARD, supra note 62, at 5. 
 64. 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2002). 
 65. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS. (May 2002) (stating that any treatment received by a woman would 
be incident to the treatment the fetus receives), available at 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/hill_ltr_0506schip.html. 
 66. See id. (arguing that treatments such as epidurals during delivery may not be 
considered necessary to promote the health of the baby and, therefore, may not 
receive insurance coverage). 
 67. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 612 (arguing that in a wanted pregnancy, a 
mother fully intends to bring the child to term so, therefore, there is no need for the 
state to interfere to protect the life of the fetus); Page, supra note 55, at 402 (stating 
that prosecutors are waging war against black women through fetal rights); 
McConnell, supra note 9, at 307-08 (describing instances where pregnant women had 
to answer for harm done to the wanted fetus). 
 68. Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine Is Mine, But What’s Yours Should Also Be Mine: 
An Analysis of State Statutes That Mandate the Implantation of Frozen Embryos, 10 
J.L. & POL’Y 587, 587-88 (2002). 
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fertilization (“IVF”)69 have been widely used—over 45,000 
conceptions resulted from this procedure in the United States since 
1978.70  Prior to the introduction of such technology, men’s 
reproductive rights were limited entirely to pre-fertilization actions 
and decisions, including access to over-the-counter contraceptives and 
an equal opportunity to refrain from sexual activity that could result 
in procreation.71  Once conception occurred men ceased to have 
decision-making power, and the judgment of women became absolute 
because of the implications of privacy and autonomy.72  IVF delays 
this bodily integrity veto power for an indeterminate period of time 
following the actual act of reproduction.73  Although the courts have 
had little opportunity to address these issues, what they have decided 
is strikingly important for the future of women’s reproductive rights.74 
A.  Case Law 
The first major attempt of the legal system to address IVF arose in 
Tennessee in 1992.75  Davis v. Davis involved a divorcing couple 
unable to agree on the disposition of their frozen embryos, created 
from eggs extracted from the woman and combined with sperm in a 
petri dish.76  More than one egg was harvested and fertilized in this 
instance, and the unused embryos were cryopreserved for future 
use.77  Mary Sue Davis originally favored implanting these embryos 
into her own uterus but later sought to donate them to a childless 
                                                          
 69. See id. at 591 (defining IVF as the process by which a woman’s eggs are 
removed from her body, fertilized in a petri dish, and transferred to her uterus). 
 70. See id. (suggesting that conception by IVF is a growing tool to aid infertile 
couples and is enabled, in part, by growth of a technological industry). 
 71. See id. at 600 (noting that a man may choose whether to procreate, while the 
woman bears all the risks in deciding whether to continue a pregnancy). 
 72. See id. at 600-01 (writing that those who support the idea that women retain 
absolute control over the embryos bolster their contentions by extending the Roe 
logic regarding freedom to terminate a pregnancy to freedom to control the frozen 
embryos). 
 73. See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy 
Process: Developing an Equality Model To Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 455, 458 (describing pregnancy as the gatekeeper of reproductive rights). 
 74. See infra III.A-III.B (describing the case law and stating implications for 
women’s rights). 
 75. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592 (noting that the disposition of embryos presents 
a question of first impression for the Tennessee courts). 
 76. See id. at 591 (noting that a couple pending finalization of a divorce had 
seven frozen embryos remaining after completing a series of IVF procedures and that 
the sole complication with the Davis’ divorce was the disposition of the frozen 
embryos). 
 77. See id. at 592 (noting that a pregnancy did not result from the fertilized egg 
implanted in Mary Sue Davis). 
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couple, while Junior Davis preferred to have the embryos discarded.78  
The Supreme Court of Tennessee recognized the couple’s right of 
procreational autonomy, which consisted of both the right to 
procreate and the right to avoid procreation.79  To determine which 
right was superior, the court established a three-pronged test that 
looked first to the preferences of the two parties, second to the 
existence of a prior agreement concerning disposition of the 
embryos, and third to the future intentions of the parties in using the 
embryos.80  The court determined that where the preferences of the 
parties’ conflict, and a prior agreement does not exist, the right to 
avoid procreation ordinarily should prevail.81 
The right to procreate or avoid procreation is established firmly in 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  The Court held in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma in 1942 that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental 
to the very existence and survival of the race” and, consequently, 
struck down a law that forced sterilization in certain instances.82  The 
right not to procreate was expanded in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
where the Supreme Court upheld the right of married persons to 
receive information and medical advice in order to avoid 
procreation.83  This right was clarified a few years later in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, when the Court stated, “[i]f the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”84  Just one year later, the Supreme Court in Roe 
privileged the rights of women to privacy and bodily integrity once 
the pregnancy process had begun, signifying that the equal rights of 
men and women to procreate or avoid procreation ended with the 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 590 (stating that the Davis’ did not have any formal agreement 
regarding how to handle the unused embryos). 
 79. See id. at 601 (basing the recognition of procreation rights on U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent regarding reproductive freedoms). 
 80. See id. at 603-04 (noting that the court weighed the burdens of procreation 
on each party and decided ultimately that procreation would cause a greater burden 
on the party who disfavored procreation); see also Daar, supra note 73, at 460-61 
(noting the establishment of the Davis three-prong test to be used by courts in future 
instances where couples disagree over the disposition of frozen embryos). 
 81. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (stating that the right to avoid procreation 
prevails if the other party has an alternative means of achieving parenthood). 
 82. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (noting that sterilization has long-term effects that 
deprive a person of basic liberty and that the act of sterilization is irreversible). 
 83. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (striking down a state law forbidding the use of 
contraceptives as overly broad and “repulsive” to the kind of privacy expected in a 
marriage). 
 84. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added). 
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reproductive act.85 
The Court intended to treat procreative rights of men and women 
differently after the beginning of a pregnancy, as is clear from its 
decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,86 which struck down a 
requirement that a woman notify her spouse prior to having an 
abortion.87  The Casey Court deemed this requirement an “undue 
burden” on the married woman seeking an abortion and further 
justified this deprivation of men’s rights because “it is an inescapable 
biological fact that state regulation with respect to the child a woman 
is carrying will have a far greater impact on the mother’s liberty than 
on the father’s.”88  Bodily integrity rights have given the woman an 
automatic veto over the man’s procreation decision once the act of 
reproduction has occurred.89  The paradox of this veto power is that 
it protects the individual privacy of a woman and her decision 
whether to bear a child but “effectively intrude[s] into the man’s 
fundamental right to decide whether or not he will beget a child.”90 
The Davis court determined that because a frozen embryo exists 
outside of anyone’s body, it does not implicate the traditional bodily 
integrity protections, and so it serves to increase the reproductive 
rights of men for a time following fertilization of an egg.91  The Davis 
balancing test prescribes that the interests of the man and the woman 
should be weighed equally: “As they stand on the brink of potential 
parenthood, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis must be seen as 
entirely equivalent gamete-providers.”92  No longer does the woman 
have an absolute veto, resulting in a substantial boon to men’s 
rights.93 
A New York appellate court in 1997 reaffirmed the burgeoning idea 
that constitutional protection of a woman’s reproductive autonomy is 
                                                          
 85. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 170 (noting that the privacy interests of women in 
pregnancy override the state’s interest in protecting the unborn fetus). 
 86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 87. See id. at 893-94 (noting that such a requirement would prevent even women 
in abusive marriages from obtaining legal abortions). 
 88. Id. at 896 (noting that because a woman physically bears the child, the 
pregnancy more “directly and immediately” affects her). 
 89. See Totz, supra note 6, at 148 (stating that once a woman makes a decision 
about a fetus the man is generally bound by her decision whether he disagrees or 
not). 
 90. Id. at 182-83. 
 91. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (noting that despite the physical stress on a 
woman in extracting eggs, a man and woman are mutual parties to the potential “joys 
of parenthood”). 
 92. Id. at 604. 
 93. See id. (noting that although women undergo more hardships in IVF than 
men, both have equal rights). 
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not implicated until implantation.94  In Kass v. Kass, the court found 
an unequivocal statement of the intent of the parties in their 
informed consent document and never reached the question that the 
Davis court was forced to decide.95  Kass stated that an indication of 
mutual intent regarding disposition must be “scrupulously honored, 
and the courts must refrain from any interference with the parties’ 
expressed wishes.”96  This deference is essential because “the decision 
to attempt to have children through IVF procedures and the 
determination of the fate of cryopreserved pre-zygotes resulting 
therefrom are intensely personal and essentially private matters which 
are appropriately resolved by the prospective parents rather than the 
courts.”97  The Kass dissent did note a possible exception to this rule 
for instances where honoring the statement would violate public 
policy.98 
A public policy concern was the cornerstone of the Massachusetts 
decision in 2000 in the case of A.Z. v. B.Z.99  The court found the 
possibility of a valid contract in a consent form signed by the couple 
and the clinic, which provided that upon separation of the couple, the 
embryos would be given to the wife for implantation.100  However, the 
lower court was not convinced that the parties intended this 
agreement to cover the situation at hand, where a dispute arose 
between them.101  Unable to validate the agreement, the court ruled 
against the wife’s objections because they would force the husband to 
procreate against his wishes.102  Such an outcome would violate 
public policy, as “forced procreation is not an area amenable to 
judicial enforcement.”103  The court also noted that the legislature 
had determined that individuals should not be held to contractual 
agreements binding them to certain familial relationships.104  As a 
                                                          
 94. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 95. See id. at 587-88  (noting that the contract’s provision to dispose of all 
remaining pre-zygotes in the event the couple divorced). 
 96. Id. at 590. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 601 (Miller, J., dissenting); see also Yang, supra note 68, at 609 
(discussing how the outcome of Kass may have differed if other public policy 
questions had been raised in the appeal). 
 99. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 100. See id. at 1054 (noting that the couple could have altered the agreement 
before signing it). 
 101. See id. at 1055 (noting that the couple had given birth to twins, which the 
judge ruled as a change to the circumstances of the original agreement). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1057-58. 
 104. See id. at 1058 (citing the elimination of breach of promise to marry as a 
cause of action). 
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result, the court applied a straightforward comparison of the present 
intentions of the parties, privileging the right not to procreate.105 
A similar outcome followed in the 2001 New Jersey case of J.B. v. 
M.B.106  In that case, a married couple signed a consent form for the 
IVF clinic providing that upon divorce the couple would relinquish 
the frozen embryos to the clinic unless they obtained a court order 
specifying control and direction.107  The court found that the consent 
form’s conditional language was not enough to establish a clear intent 
by the parties regarding disposition.108  Therefore, the court turned 
to an analysis of the intentions of the parties and reaffirmed the 
finding that the right to avoid procreation is superior to the right to 
procreate.109 
B.  Implications of Feminist Theory 
These were all issues of first impression in the courts, and the rule 
that emerges from them is murky: a court must look at each 
individual case to evaluate the interests of both parties in the creation 
of embryos.110  Each case represents not only a split among the states 
but also within the states.  For example, the lower court in New York, 
overruled on appeal by the highest state court, awarded custody of the 
embryos to the woman.111  The New York lower court’s decision was 
based on the theory that a man had no greater rights to frozen 
embryos than he did to an in vivo embryo.112  The decision of the 
lower state court implicates a formal equality theory that fertile and 
infertile women should be treated alike: women undergoing IVF 
treatment should have the same right to control the use or 
termination of the frozen embryos as a woman would during a normal 
pregnancy, for any other result is discrimination against the woman 
who is unable to conceive through natural methods.113  “For decades, 
women have fought for the precious right to procreational autonomy.  
                                                          
 105. See id. at 1059 (noting the state and the court’s desire not to force individuals 
into unwanted relationships). 
 106. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 107. Id. at 710. 
 108. Id. at 713 (noting that the only clear reading of the agreement was that the 
clinic retained control over the embryos unless the parties had chosen otherwise in a 
writing or unless a court order specified otherwise upon divorce). 
 109. See id. at 717-18 (reasoning that a contract compelling parenthood against 
one’s will is unenforceable on public policy grounds). 
 110. See Daar, supra note 73, at 459-61 (outlining the three-prong test the Kass 
court first articulated). 
 111. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 590-91. 
 112. Id. at 585. 
 113. See Daar, supra note 73, at 462 
16
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss1/6
2005]   FEMINIST THEORY AND EROSION OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 103 
The advent of reproductive technology, designed to equalize the 
reproductive opportunities for all women, should not stand as a 
detractor to the rights of infertile women.”114  The appeals court 
rejected this formal equality idea, focusing on the location of the 
embryo outside of the body rather than on protecting the 
reproductive liberties of women.115  The result of Kass produces 
greater gender equality, but it does so at the expense of procreational 
autonomy for infertile women.116 
By including the ideas of bodily integrity and personal autonomy in 
a constitutional right to privacy, the courts have been able to 
distinguish reproductive rights law from other areas of the law that 
have been dominated by equal protection arguments.  Roe and Casey 
pronounced that men had no equal protection argument in the 
decisions a woman made about the fetus when it was physically 
incorporated into her own body.117  These IVF cases not only 
represent a rejection of this privacy right, but also they further 
disregard the liberal feminist theory that men and women approach 
the procreative process from unique angles, which should be 
considered when allocating rights to achieve equality.118  The ruling 
of the Davis court that both progenitors had an equal interest in the 
disposition of their frozen embryos disregarded the importance of 
bodily integrity and created an equal protection claim for men, 
effectively eroding women’s rights by allocating them elsewhere. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
Fetal personhood laws and court decisions involving IVF 
increasingly equalize the rights of all parties in the reproductive 
process.  Instead of producing a greater sense of equality in 
reproductive choices for men and women, this approach to 
reproductive rights has served to curtail the rights of women in 
decisions involving procreation by diminishing the strength of the 
constitutional protections of bodily integrity and privacy.  Feminist 
                                                          
 114. Id. at 466. 
 115. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (ruling that although IVF can have a 
tremendous impact on a person emotionally, the original agreement between the 
parties should be upheld). 
 116. See Daar, supra note 73, at 466 (arguing that women should not lose their 
right to control their embryos because their partners have changed their mind 
regarding their disposition). 
 117. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (noting that the right of a woman to terminate her 
pregnancy fell within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment subject only to 
important state interests); Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (mentioning only the state’s interest 
and declining to mention men’s role in decisions to terminate a pregnancy). 
 118. See supra Part I (discussing the different feminist theories and their 
approaches to reproductive rights). 
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theory should determine how best to protect women’s reproductive 
rights in this new environment and guide the law to provide such 
protection.  The law must continue to recognize that “[t]o deprive 
women of their right to control their actions during pregnancy is to 
deprive women of their legal personhood.”119  The right to physical 
integrity is supreme, as it ensures the basic privacy freedom of women, 
which is still a constitutional right.  Feminists should choose a theory 
to support carefully and use its structure to argue stringently against 
fetal personhood laws that erode the bodily integrity of women and 
seek to reinforce a historical system of inequality.  There is no formal 
equality justification for attempting to equalize the rights of the 
woman and the fetus, which are directly contradictory.120  Relational 
feminism is dangerous because it provides arguments that could be 
used to support fetal personhood legislation through the ethic of care 
and mutual responsibility.121  Material connections to the fetus 
increasingly have been used by the state to justify interference with 
women’s decisions during pregnancy, and responsibility arguments 
may reward men for becoming more involved with their children and 
with domestic chores.122  These rewards take rights away from women 
in the reproductive choice arena, instead of increasing joint decision-
making. 
Dominance theory advocates more state involvement in changing 
the focus of society from male-domination.123  This could become a 
powerful argument for legislation protecting women’s rights from 
usurpation by the fetus.  However, the legislation that has been 
enacted so far consistently has regulated the actions of women and 
reinforced the status quo instead of undermining it.124  Thus far, 
liberal feminist difference theory is the only argument that has 
withstood scrutiny by the courts and various attacks by the 
legislatures.125  Women’s reproductive rights thrive under the 
                                                          
 119. Johnsen, supra note 3, at 620. 
 120. See Misner, supra note 41, at 298 (discussing how the movement to endow a 
fetus with more rights infringes on women’s rights in the abortion context). 
 121. See McConnell, supra note 9, at 303-05 (discussing the effect of the Farley 
decision on abortion). 
 122. See generally Johnsen, supra note 3 (citing various cases where women’s 
rights clashed with fetal rights); see also Totz, supra note 6, at 198-202 (noting how 
changes in society have resulted in different expectations and different roles for men 
in the household). 
 123. See Rothenberg, supra note 16, at 482 (noting that the theory suggests that 
the major difference between men and women is that women are subordinate to 
men). 
 124. See, e.g., DAILARD, supra note 62, at 3 (discussing changes in SCHIP that 
evade pregnant women’s rights). 
 125. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Casey, 505 U.S. at 875.  Both cases are 
grounded in traditional reproductive privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity 
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encouragement of privacy, autonomy and a lack of 
interconnectedness.126  Advocates should unite behind these 
concepts to prevent the state from increasingly defining and 
regulating the behavior of women merely because of their capacity to 
be pregnant. 
Furthermore, the law must allocate rights regarding IVF treatment 
in a way that will not disadvantage women on the basis of infertility.  
IVF is a new area of the law, but it implicates rights at the very core of 
women’s reproductive freedom.127  Following the lead of the courts, 
some legislatures have begun to enact laws concerning IVF treatments 
and embryo disposition.128  Florida requires an express written 
agreement by the couple concerning later disposition of the frozen 
embryos in the event of divorce, death, or other unforeseen 
circumstance prior to any procedure.129  New Hampshire requires 
medical examinations and counseling prior to undergoing the IVF 
treatment.130  New Mexico and Louisiana have enacted the most 
extreme laws, which could be interpreted to privilege the rights of the 
embryo over both the man and the woman through required 
implantation of all embryos, either by the couple or through adoptive 
implantation.131  Implantation, rather than disposition, is required in 
Louisiana because the embryo is not the property of the progenitors 
but a separate person or entity with a legal right to health and 
welfare.132 
These statutes and court decisions demonstrate the crucial need for 
feminist advocacy in this area, or the legal power of women’s equality 
and personal autonomy will be severely diminished.  IVF may be an 
area of the law best governed by dominance theory, which could 
change the societal norm by bringing private family issues out into the 
                                                          
concerns. 
 126. See Wagner, supra note 21 at 1094; McConnell, supra note 9, at 306-07. 
 127. See supra Part III.A (discussing the IVF case law and its effect on traditional 
reproductive rights laws). 
 128. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (2004) (requiring couples to sign express 
contracts regarding disposition of embryos before engaging in IVF procedures). 
 129. Id. 
 130. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13, 168-B:18 (2003). 
 131. N.M. STAT. ANN. §24-9A-[1] (Michie 2003).  Although this provision deals with 
clinical research and expressly excludes IVF treatments, it has been interpreted by 
some scholars to be overly vague in these distinctions.  See Cynthia Reilly, 
Constitutional Limits on New Mexico’s In Vitro Fertilization Law, 24 N.M.L. REV. 125 
(1994) (stating that the IVF law, while purporting to cover only research treatments, 
is unconstitutionally vague and unclear in its scope); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 
(2004) (noting that eggs fertilized in vitro are solely for complete development of 
humans through implantation); § 9:129 (stating that a viable IVF ovum is judicially 
regarded as a person and shall not be intentionally destroyed). 
 132. § 9:129. 
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public and encouraging individual contracts.  Contracts ensure 
against further erosion of reproductive rights through the subjective 
analysis of each individual governing court or legislature.  Such 
contracts govern an area of reproductive health that otherwise would 
be controlled by the liberty and bodily integrity interests that the 
courts seem willing to discard.  They represent new interests of the 
entities in the reproductive process, as they give the state the right to 
be involved in some intimate family decisions, and they also increase 
the rights of a man to have input in the use or disposition of the 
embryos.  However, they are a concrete way to clarify rights and 
equalize the progenitors without extensive subjective analysis and 
debate. 
The Davis and Kass courts romanticized the idea of having a 
contract that would answer all of the hard questions about disposition 
of embryos,133 but the J.B. and A.Z. courts reacted negatively to the 
enforcement of such contracts because enforcing such contracts 
would insert the state into private family issues.134  Any solution, 
however, necessarily will involve some type of intrusive state action, 
whether it is through legislation, a court order determining 
disposition, or a court order enforcing a contract.  Feminist theorists 
must advocate a type of intrusion that will protect the vital 
reproductive interests of women in this changing legal environment. 
CONCLUSION 
Feminist theorists must be vigilant in order to prevent the swell of 
rights opposed to the rights of women in the reproductive process.  
Vigilance is essential to ensure that the rights of the state, the fetus, 
and the man collectively do not overwhelm women’s reproductive 
autonomy.  Feminist theory has contributed to this possible erosion by 
promoting pure equality between men and women and developing 
liberal theories of interdependence.  The state courts and legislatures 
have welcomed a change in focus from subjective decisions regarding 
autonomy to equality and have applied it to situations involving the 
disposition of frozen embryos.  This has taken away the emphasis on 
women’s rights, however, and has been detrimental to the 
reproductive rights discussion.  At the core of any future legal 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (noting that a valid contract should be 
upheld, but also noting that conditions surrounding the contract change); Kass, 663 
N.Y.S.2d at 590-91 (concluding that courts must refrain from interfering with the 
parties contractually expressed interests). 
 134. See, e.g., A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 162 (noting that people have freedom and 
privacy rights to shape their personal lives); J.B., 783 A.2d at 719 (declaring their rule 
allowing parties to change contracts better suited to public policy). 
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argument must lie the notion that the right to physical integrity is 
supreme, as it protects the basic privacy freedom of women from 
unwanted bodily invasions. 
Feminists will play a paramount role in the future of legal 
developments regarding fetal personhood and IVF.  Difference theory 
can restore the rights of women by acknowledging the unique nature 
of the reproductive process for each entity involved, while also 
encouraging respect for autonomy and bodily integrity.  Dominance 
theory and contract enforcement can change the status quo and 
protect women’s reproductive choices from scientific developments.  
Advocates must be assertive in fighting the erosion of women’s 
reproductive rights through fetal personhood laws and IVF decisions. 
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